6 May 1958

Copy No. 140

# CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

## BULLETIN




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DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

### TOP SECRET





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no		Army commander General		
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us	United States to of wheat, corn from American valued at over port requirements one of	Cairo officials are consider o supply the UAR with substant of and other agricultural and a surplus stocks. The quan \$60,000,000, are in line with ents of the Egyptian sector of the first UAR probing effort political attitude toward Egyptiement.	tantial quantities I food products tities envisaged, h the normal im- of the UAR. This ts to determine	2
ho	under British of Aden Protector have been a certific in the area. So	en: One hundred and fifty solirection have raided an instate sultanate of Lahej, whin ter for Yemeni-supported eizure of a ''considerable que and the arrest of several	tallation in the ch is reported to arms distribution uantity'' of arms	
	6 May 58	DAILY BRIEF	ii	

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	passport, affe	ling an individual with a recent ords further evidence of a well	-developed Yemeni	25*
	apparatus for Colony.	promoting subversion in Aden	Protectorate and	
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No	Western polit Greece permi territory, it	Khrushchev, apparently trying ical elements in Greece, has ts the establishment of missile will expose itself to nuclear re	warned that if e bases on its taliation, and he re-	
	wiḍely publici before the 11	t espousal of the Greek Cypric zed remarks, in response to a May Greek national election,	Greek press query may result in in-	25 <b>X</b>
	creasing popu	lar concern with two highly se	nsitive issues.	
zes	the demoraliz ous parts of the party lead	creasing awareness among the ed condition of Nehru's Congre the country is probably large ers' reluctance to let Nehru va	ess party in numer- ly responsible for acate the premier-	25X1
	party seems a more defection ly left the Cor- defections cou attempt a take	a brief period. At the momen about to lose control of Orissa ans from the government bench agress party without a majority ald set the stage for an opposite over. New Delhi may try to per chief minister and taking over	State. Five or es have apparent- y. A few more ion coalition to revent this by	
	of the state ur also badly dis	der President's Rule. The Coorganized in Punjab, Uttar Pra	ngress party is	25🗶
	6 May 58	DAILY BRIEF	iii	
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		III. THE WEST		
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ges		President Frondizi's first a granting any new import pe		:
	an audit of Arge	entina's economic position.	In asking Vice	
		n for American assistance, JS government credits as a		
	couraging a lar	ge volume of private investr	nent. The visit-	
		y minister of foreign affair rgentine officials to follow		•
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	to build heavy i	ndustries on easy credit ter	ms.	2
	6 May 58	DAILY BRIEF	iv	
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## Peiping Issues Communist Bloc's Sharpest Rebuke of Yugoslav Party Program

The Chinese Communists are attacking the Yugoslav party program in terms which make it clear there is no sympathy for Tito in the Chinese Communist leadership. The Peiping People's Daily of 4 May compares the program's "outand-out revisionism" with other heresies in the history of the international Communist movement, accuses the Yugoslav leaders of speaking "like reactionaries of all countries," and charges that Belgrade is trying to "split" the bloc. The Chinese allege that Belgrade has spurned all efforts at reconciliation despite the bloc's policy of "waiting patiently" for the Yugoslav leaders to "return" to orthodoxy.

The editorial supports previous indications that Peiping is anxious to put an end to misinterpretations of the Chinese Communist attitude toward the satellites. For more than a year now, Peiping's commentaries on the leading role of the USSR and the need for bloc unity and its definitions of orthodoxy have generally accorded with Moscow's prescriptions. In an effort to prevent satellite writers from using unique internal Chinese policies for polemical purposes against Moscow, Peiping portrays Mao's theoretical innovations as a continuation rather than refutation of Soviet doctrine.

Peiping's blistering article appeared after the publication of the more conciliatory Hungarian line which had been prepared before the end of the Yugoslav party congress. At that time Moscow probably still hoped to effect a change in the Yugoslav program by a "reasonable" approach. The Soviet leaders would probably prefer to avoid becoming directly involved in polemics and are therefore willing to have Peiping push this attack.

The statement, coming on the eve of the eighth congress of the Chinese Communist party which opened on 5 May, sets the tone for 'hard-line' declarations on both foreign and domestic issues.

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#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

#### Situation in Indonesia

Dissident troops under the personal command of Lt. Col. Sumual on 5 May made an unopposed landing and secured the airfield at Djailolo on Halmahera Island. Some 500 men were to have been used in the operation, which was staged from Morotai Island to the north. Sumual was planning to leave 200 men behind to garrison Morotai, which he recently took in an amphibious operation. The dissidents are planning to reoccupy the Palu area in central Celebes, which is being used as a staging area for further government operations against the dissidents.

Meanwhile, Lt. Col. Rukmito, the government commander
in the Palu area, is said to be in Djakarta urgently requesting
air support. Army headquarters reportedly informed him that
aircraft now supporting operations in Sumatra will be shifted to
East Indonesia, probably by next week.
dissident air attacks are having a serious effect on the Indo-
nesian Army. The airfields at Kendari and Ambon have been ren-
dered nonoperational by air attacks.
Central government operational plans for North Celebes in-
clude landings in the Gorontalo area, supported by air drops and
air cover from two fighters, two bombers, and one PBY,
Up to 5,400 troops will be used
in the final drive on Menado. Meanwhile, an army spokesman
in Djakarta has announced that the dissidents in North Celebes
have asked for negotiations. His claim is thus far unsubstantiated.
liave asked for negotiations. This chain is thus far unsubstantiated.
Manada and in his amounted that the diggident conital hog
Menado radio has announced that the dissident capital has
been transferred to Menado, and that Col. Warrouw, former mil-
itary attaché in Peiping, has been named chief administrator of
the revolutionary regime.

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#### Egypt Seeking US Surplus Agricultural Commodities

Egyptian officials, who earlier this year had put out feelers for American surplus agricultural commodities, now are considering asking for substantial amounts valued at over \$60,000,000, according to the under secretary of the Ministry of Supply. This approach reflects a continuing shortage of foreign exchange. It may also be a means of probing American policy toward Egypt.

Although the quantities involved are relatively large, they are within normal Egyptian import requirements. Egypt has already contracted for about 900,000 tons of wheat for the current season--30 June 1957 - 1 July 1958--but total commitments for the 1958/59 season have not yet been made. However, Cairo will import at least 250,000 tons from the USSR during the 1958/59 season. Egypt's hopes of increasing wheat imports from Syria have been frustrated by the sharp shortfall in the Syrian crop resulting from drought and locust infestation.

The Egyptian request is for 500,000 tons of wheat, 100,000 tons of corn, 65,000 tons of sugar, 60,000 tons of tallow, and unstated amounts of tobacco, cottonseed oil, and frozen meats and chicken. All of these items are in relatively short supply in Egypt and are presently under government price regulations. From time to time during the past year, shortages became acute and speculation had to be halted by forceful government action.

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#### The Indian Political Situation

In recent months, the Indian people have become increasingly aware that Prime Minister Nehru's once-monolithic Congress party is suffering a serious decline. Party factionalism is virtually universal-being critical in at least 6 of India's 13 states--and party members are opposing party candidates in national parliamentary and state assembly elections. The Congress has lost control of New Delhi and Bombay city governments and rules that of Calcutta by a bare majority. In Andhra State, it has lost six out of eight by-elections since March 1957. Leading Congress party members are being defeated in "prestige" elections, into which the party is throwing considerable effort.

For these reasons, the national leaders of the Congress party are understandably reluctant to permit Nehru to hand over the reins of government even for a brief period. The party has noted that "fissiparous tendencies (and) the ugly monsters of regionalism, communalism, casteism, and social and political obscurantism are rearing up their heads," and has refused to do without Nehru's "dynamic leadership and mature wisdom."

Nehru has not been able to halt the party's decline, however, and it seems in imminent danger of losing control of Orissa State in addition to Kerala. At least five defections from government benches there have apparently left the Congress party without a majority in the 140-man state assembly. Further withdrawal of support by the five-man Jharkand party or the seven independents could enable the opposition to oust the Congress and form a coalition government. A maneuver by the Communists to gain respectability by supporting the Congress would be equally embarrassing to Nehru, who has spoken strongly against them.

President's Rule, or direct administration from New Delhi, seems a likely prospect in Orissa.

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#### Argentine President Seeks Foreign Capital

In a conversation with Vice President Nixon on 2 May, President Frondizi expressed hope for American assistance in solving Argentina's serious economic problems. He mentioned especially government credits which would help encourage a large volume of private investment. Frondizi specified deficiencies in electric power, transportation, and petroleum--points which he highlighted in his inaugural address on 1 May calling for austerity and new investment to avoid national bankruptcy.

Frondizi's first official act was to suspend issuance of new import permits pending an audit of the country's outstanding commitments. This probably precedes tightening restrictions on imports other than essentials such as fuel, which cost \$317,500,000 in 1957. Frondizi told Nixon that private capital could aid oil development through contracts—though not concessions—providing for reasonable profits.

Since Peron's ouster in 1955 there has been no large-scale foreign investment to help expand or modernize productive facilities or to counter the balance-of-payments deficit, which amounted to some \$300,000,000 for 1957. The Frondizi regime faces an external debt of about \$700,-000,000, and as of 8 April 1958 gold and foreign exchange holdings had fallen to \$288,000,000.

Visiting Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kuznetsov had not been able to obtain an appointment with Frondizi before the inauguration, but has reportedly emphasized
to other Argentine officials that Argentina should spurn foreign capital from the West and follow the examples of India
and Egypt, which have reached agreements with the USSR to
build steel mills and other heavy industries on easy credit
terms. Kuznetsov, however, did not make any specific
offer. There were earlier reports
that the USSR had offered Argentina a loan of \$300,000,000.

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